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SECURITIES REGULATIONS
gress never contemplated pretrial removal,"6 but the dissent main-
tained that the President was concerned only about the criminal
liability of the state court judges under the act 7 and that Senator
Trumbull was replying to Johnson in reference only to this aspect of
the statute. "The Senator did not say, as the majority would infer,
that these sections could not be brought into play by the action of
. . . sheriffs and policemen . . . prior to the court proceedings.""
Dissenting Judges Bell and Sobeloff would hold these cases re-
movable under subsection 1443 (1) if "they have been denied these
rights by state officials prior to trial .... -
Part of the reason for the wide divergence in the opinions can
be traced to the long period of time in which the problems remained
dormant because of the lack of appellate review and the futility of
attempting to reach conclusions about century-old congressional
mood or intent. There seems to be some merit to the argument
of the dissenters that the Eighty-ninth Congress meant for the fed-
eral courts to re-examine their position in regard to removal when
it passed the proviso for appellate review of an order to remand.
Whether or not this be the case, the conflict in the circuit courts
necessitates clear explanation of the Rives and Powers opinions by
a modern Court.
BILLY R. BARR
Securities Regulations-Civil Liability Under Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Rule 15cl-7 of the Exchange Act
In the expanding area of securities regulations, the Securities
Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 together
with the rules promulgated thereunder, have been used increasingly
as bases for finding civil liability for violations thereof. While
sections 11, 12(1), and 12(2) 3 of the Securities Act and sections
357 F.2d at 767.
, Section 2 of the original act of 1866, now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964),
provided that any state official who "shall subject or cause to be subjected
any inhabitant ... to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by
this act.., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
-8 357 F.2d at 783.
30 Id. at 773.
'48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1964).
248 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
'48 Stat. 82, 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1964).
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9(e), 16(b), 18, and 29(b) 4 of the Exchange Act expressly pro-
vide for civil remedies, liabilities in civil actions have been implied
under other sections and rules.5
A recent decision extended a civil remedy to yet another rule
under the Exchange Act. In Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co.' a
federal district court allowed recovery of damages under section
17(a) of the Securities Act' and rule 15cl-7 8 promulgated under
section 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange Act.' Plaintiff, a school teacher,
had transferred his life savings to an account with defendant
brokerage house. McNutt, a salesman of defendant, was to trade
the account intending to make short-swing profits for plaintiff.
'48 Stat. 889, 896, 897, 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p,
78r, 78cc (1964).
'J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (sections 14(a) and 27
of the Exchange Act); Goldenburg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.
1959) (section 7 of the Exchange Act); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v.
Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (section 12(f)
of the Exchange Act); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (section 17(a) of the Securities Act); Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (section
11(d) (2) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-5) ; Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5). For a full discussion of expressed and implied civil
liabilities under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the rules pursuant
thereto, see also Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. Rzv. 12 (1966).
' CCH FED. SEc. L. REP,. 91,621. (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1965).
48 Stat. 84-5 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964). Section 17(a) of the
act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communications in interstate commerce or by the use of mails, direct-
ly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser.
'C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1964) Section (a) provides:
The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device, or con-
trivance", as used in section 15(c) of the act, is hereby defined to
include any act of any broker or dealer designed to effect with or for
any customer's account in respect to which such broker or dealer or
his agent or employee is vested with any discretionary power any
transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size or fre-
quency in view of the financial resources and character of such ac-
count.
.52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1964).
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Plaintiff was not familiar with the sophisticated maneuvers used in
a trading account; therefore, he relied heavily on McNutt to man-
age the account in plaintiff's best interests. McNutt effected numer-
ous transactions in the account over a three-month period, generat-
ing 2,722.55 dollars in commissions and causing capital losses of
2,245.57 dollars. In view of the fact that the account when opened
contained a net equity of 8,439.65 dollars, the court held such
heavy trading to be excessive and awarded damages equal to the
amount of commissions charged.
Rule 15cl-7 is violated only where the account is discretionary.
In finding the plaintiff's account to be discretionary, the court did
not restrict itself to the formality of requiring "prior written au-
thorization" by the customer.10 Instead, the court applied a more
practical test by looking to the customer's naivete and the degree of
reliance placed upon McNutt's advice. Such a position is in line
with decisions rendered by the SEC."
The court in the principal case appeared to have little difficulty
in finding an abuse of discretion in the actions of the salesman. The
court rested its holding on the unusually large amount of commis-
sions generated, the total value of the transactions (158,000 dol-
lars) that took place in the three-month period, and the proportion
of the salesman's total commissions represented by this single ac-
count (seventeen per cent). This reasoning is consistent with hold-
ings of the Commission in cases dealing with churning-excessive
trading-of customers' accounts.' 2
" N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 408, CCH N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE 2408. A
salesman has discretionary power over a customer's account where "the
prior written authorization of the customer has been received." Where such
authorization is given, a salesman may trade the account for the customer's
benefit without receiving specific orders from the customer.
" The Commission in Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 870
(1946), held that an account was discretionary when a broker-dealer could
"dominate the choice of investment and the timing and frequency of trans-
actions... ." In E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945),
the Commission declared that in regard to discretionary accounts the signifi-
cant determination involves the status between the broker-dealer and the
customer. In Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 168 (1947), no express
discretionary power was conferred on the dealer; however, the Commission
found the registrant guilty of churning accounts of its customers. The
Commission pointed out that the registrant occupied a position of trust in
respect to its customers and should have managed their accounts with their
best interest as a guide.
"E.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,306
(1965); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960); Walter S. Grubbs, 28
S.E.C. 323 (1948).
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Although the traditional remedies for violations of section 17(a)
of the Securities Act and rule 15c1-7 have been administrative sanc-
tions imposed by the SEC,' 3 the court allowed recovery of damages.
It is not entirely clear whether the court based civil liability on a
violation of section 17(a) or rule 15cl-7 or both. The general
fraud provisions of section 17(a) have been relied upon under
somewhat different circumstances to attach civil liability.14 At the
same time, no cases have been reported prior to Newkirk in which
rule 15cl-7 was premised as a basis for recovery of damages.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the provisions of rule 15cl-7 that
specifically prohibit churning are more directly applicable than the
general fraud provisions of section 17(a)."5
Although there is no express provision for civil liability under
rule 15cl-7, the decision implying such liability is in keeping with
a trend begun in 1946 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.'" There
the court allowed recovery of damages for a violation of rule
10b-5.' The federal district court based its holding on two theories:
(1) common-law tort liability as a result of violation of a statute, 8
and (2) the implication of the wording of section 29(b) of the
Exchange Act. 9 The former has particular applicability in New-
kirk. Traditionally, courts have allowed recovery of damages for
injuries resulting from violations of statutory enactments.20 A
1 Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960) (suspension of registrant and
Reynolds & Co. from membership in the National Association of Securities
Dealers for thirty days); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163 (1947)
(revocation of registration of registrant and expulsion from membership
in the National Association of Securities Dealers).
" E.g., Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). (Action
to recover damages for fraudulent misstatements and omissions of material
facts in connection with the sale of stock); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp.
869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
1 Compare sections quoted in notes 7 and 8 supra.
0 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
17 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1964).
8 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
19 Id. at 514. 48 Stat. 903 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78cc(b)
(1964).
"0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 286, comment d (1965), discussing
the situation where a criminal statute does not provide expressly for civil
liability, states in part:
[T]he court is free, in making its own judicial rules, to adopt and
apply to the negligence action the standard of conduct provided by
such a criminal enactment or regulation. . . . The decision to adopt
the standard [of conduct] is purely a judicial one, for the court to
make.... On the same basis, the court may adopt the standard of
conduct laid down by an administrative regulation.
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member of a class for whose protection a criminal statute or regula-
tion was designed may sue for damages caused by a breach of such
law.2 The dominating purpose of the Exchange Act and the rules
promulgated thereunder is to provide protection for investors. 2
Certainly, a customer whose account has been excessively traded
falls within the class of persons to be protected by rule 15cl-7 and
the violation of the rule by the salesman constitutes activity from
which investors are protected.
Another premise upon which civil liability can be argued is
found in the jurisdictional section of the Exchange Act.23 That
section states that the federal district courts "shall have exclusive
jurisdiction ... of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and
regulations thereunder."24 Such language would seem to imply that
Congress had civil suits for damages in mind when this section was
written.
25
A final argument for civil liability was made by the court in
Newkirk. Under section 15A(b) (4) of the Exchange Act, the SEC
is empowered to bar a broker from membership in the National
Association of Securities Dealers for violations of the Act.26 It
would seem that allowing recovery of damages in a private action
would constitute a less drastic result and might be preferable in
some situations.
The principal argument posed against the extension of civil
liability is the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e.,
since Congress neglected to make express provisions for civil liabil-
ity, it intended that there be none. This doctrine was severely
limited as a rule of construction in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
21Id. at § 286; Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1134-35 (1950).
" 14 U. CmI. L. REv. 471, 474-75 (1947); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120,
1133 (1950). The author of the former note suggests that
each section of the several federal securities acts in which certain
conduct is made unlawful, and in which no exclusive remedy is pro-
vided, might become the basis of civil actions of the type under dis-
cussion, provided the section is designed for the protection of in-
vestors.
14 U. CHI. L. REv. at 478.
'348 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
"'48 Stat. at 902-03; 15 U.S.C. at § 78aa. (Emphasis added.)
"B Lowenfels, supra note 5, at 18-19.
52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (4) (1964).
* Comment, 59 YALE: L.J. 1120, 1133 & n.68 (1950).
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Corp., 8 where the Court stated that the rule must be "subordinated
to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in con-
formity with its dominating general purpose .. ."I Since the
dominating purpose of the Exchange Act is to protect investors, 80
and since section 28(a) of the act provides that remedies created
by the act shall be in addition to those available in law or equity,,"
it would seem that expressio unius est exclusio alterius has little or
no applicability to a construction of the Exchange Act.
The court in Newkirk, while allowing liability for damages in
a civil action, left several questions open for later clarification. For
example, to what extent does a heavy loss in an account influence
the court in its finding of an abuse of discretion? It would seem
that at least some attention should be directed toward the general
market trend during the period, since a broker-dealer should not be
made to bear the burden of errors of judgment. To hold otherwise
would allow the court to take advantage of hindsight in second-
guessing the broker-dealer. At the same time, should the court take
notice of the caliber of securities traded in a discretionary account?
If so, then possibly the measure of damages should go beyond the
commissions earned when it is shown that the particular securities
traded were highly speculative and of doubtful value. Assuming
commissions earned to be the correct measure of damages, would a
recovery be allowed where an account, shown to have been exces-
sively traded, has yielded a net profit? Although a case involving
such a situation would be unlikely to arise, it must be remembered
that the commissions charged still represent a reduction in the equity
of the account. Where a reckless and willful disregard for the
customer's interests is displayed by a broker-dealer while churning
an account, should the court allow a recovery of punitive dam-
ages ?"2 While the decision in Newkirk seems to be in line with the
prevailing trend of the courts, the traditional application of tort
liability for statutory violations, and the dominating purpose of the
Exchange Act, it is evident that further decisions will be necessary
"320 U.S. 344 (1943).
'8 Id. at 350.
o See note 22 supra.
8148 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964).
22An award of punitive damages would be highly unlikely since § 28 of
the Exchange Act expressly prohibits a recovery under the act in excess
of actual damages sustained. 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1964).
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to delineate the scope of and grounds for civil liability under rule
15cl-7.
CHARLES E. ELROD, JR.
Taxation-Charitable Deductions-Bequest for Benefit of Employees
The majority shareholder of a corporation made a bequest of
forty per cent of his residuary estate to a testamentary trust to pro-
vide pension payments-to the employees of the corporation. Em-
ployees employed prior to, or at the time of, decedent's death who
retired after twenty-five years of service were to receive monthly
pension payments of not more than 125 dollars.' Yearly trust in-
come in excess of that needed for pension payments was to be paid
over to an employees' trust fund created by the corporation in 1946
for pension purposes. Upon the death of the last surviving em-
ployee-beneficiary, the trustees of the testamentary trust were to
terminate it by paying 2,000 dollars to each of three named hospitals
and the remainder of the income and corpus to the employees' trust
fund. If the employees' trust fund was not in existence, the income
and corpus was to be divided equally among the three hospitals.
After the Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to allow
the decedent's bequest to the trust as a charitable deduction, the
decedent's estate paid the asserted estate tax deficiency and sued in
a federal district court for a refund. The district court,' relying on
an earlier Third Circuit decision,' held that the bequest was chari-
table and qualified for a deduction under section 812(d) of the
1939 Internal Revenue Code (the predecessor of section 2055 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). The court found that suffi-
cient public benefit flowed from the trusts to make them charitable,
the beneficiaries of the trusts were ascertainable, and the discretion
vested in the trustees was limited to disbursements for charitable
purposes. On appeal, in Watson v. United States4 a divided Third
Circuit reversed and held that the testamentary trust was not chari-
table. The majority of the court found that the trust benefited the
'The exact amount was to be determined by subtracting from $125 the
amount of Social Security benefits and corporate pension payments received
by an employee. Corporate officers and directors were not to receive pension
payments.
'Watson v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 90, 379 (D.N.J. 1963).
' Gimbel v. Comm'r, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931).
' 355 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1965).
